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Abstract: The paper discusses the recently promoted view that organized insurgent 
violence should either be conducted by activists bonded together by social capital ties 
or self-interested quasi-mercenaries, depending on the type of financial resources 
available to the group. We contrast this perspective with the study of an ethnic 
Nigerian militia, the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC). It appears that the success of 
this militia over time was jointly sustained by important preexisting social 
connections and numerous opportunities for economic gains. The perpetuation of 
OPC, we argue, is ensured by a ‘moral economy’ whose members enjoy self-
insurance in an environment perceived as unsafe.  
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Recent seminal contributions in the literature on civil conflicts have explored the 
micro-foundations of collective political violence. A great deal of attention is now 
paid to the non-state collective actors that organize violence and the specific 
constraints and challenges they face: gathering funds, recruiting combatants, 
enforcing rank and files’ commitment. The strategies implemented to solve these 
challenges have been shown to influence crucial outcomes such as the intensity of 
violence or the sustainability of violent groups over time.  
 
The paper discusses the recently promoted view that organized insurgent violence 
should either be conducted by activists bonded together by social capital ties or self-
interested quasi-mercenaries, depending on the type of financial resources available to 
the group. We contrast this perspective with the study of an ethnic Nigerian militia, 
the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC).  
 
Section II discusses the existing conceptual frameworks related to violent 
organizations and states our analytical puzzle. Section III details and interprets our 
empirical findings on the organizational dynamics of the OPC. Section IV presents 
and comments the results concerning OPC militants’ profiles and subjective motives 
for violent engagement. Section V concludes. 
 
2. ORGANIZING NON-STATE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
 
The recent literature on violent conflicts and, more specifically, irregular armed 
groups - defined as private groups contesting the state’s monopoly of legitimate  
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coercion (Davis, 2003) - is increasingly studying the interdependence of micro and 
organizational level dynamics to understand issues like enlistment of combatants; 
form, scale and location of violence; and the duration of armed conflicts.  
 
The greed/grievances dichotomy (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998), has controversially 
reified two perspectives on the rebellion-making mechanism. Put simply, rebellion 
should either be considered as the aggregation of self-interested calculations of 
individuals or the consequence of mounting injustice feelings among sections of the 
population tied together by preexisting identity bonds. This framework has 
engendered sophisticated macro-level research on the economic, social and political 
conditions likely to precipitate civil wars (see, among others, Humphreys, 2005; 
Stewart, 2008). However statistical accounts, though useful for generalization 
purposes and cross-country comparisons, have overlooked the very process through 
which violence is organized and implemented.  
 
Following recent analytical advances (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998; Kalyvas, 2006), 
violence is now recognized as a qualitatively separate issue from conflict, rather than 
a mere degree of it. If we except spontaneous riots, the great bulk of violence 
witnessed during civil wars is - at least to some extent - planned, and perpetrated by 
members of organized groups. Hence, to address such questions as why, where and 
how physical violence is perpetrated, a meso-level look at violent organizations is a 
necessary complement to the macro-level perspectives evoked above. One should 





Here, crucially, questions of finance sustaining armed organizations arise. Various 
more or less exclusive options exist: finance may be gathered through illegal 
diversion of natural resources, external sponsorship, coercive taxation of civilians, 
voluntary contributions, cross-border trafficking and smuggling, or, more 
spectacularly, criminal kidnapping or robbery. The second challenge a rebel 
entrepreneur has to overcome is to recruit manpower and make sure it sticks together 
over time.  
 
Weinstein’s recent account on the ‘industrial organization of violence’ articulates 
neatly rebels’ fundraising activities and their recruiting strategies in a typology made 
of two polar organizational strategies, alternatively labeled ‘activist’ or ‘opportunistic’ 
(Weinstein, 2006). Weinstein introduces an explicit and continuous trade-off between 
the two organizational strategies that decisively affect recruitment policies. To him, 
the respective shares of politicized activists and opportunists within a rebellion 
directly stem from the financial constraints faced by rebel leaders. Recruiting 
strategies are ex ante choices. Financially well-endowed rebellions tend to attract 
recruits driven by immediate profit prospects while poor rebellions have to resort to 
recruits less attracted by quick material benefits. The existence of locally lootable 
natural resources or external sponsorship facilitate the emergence of the ‘opportunist’ 
type of rebellion, while the lack of instant material rewards for militants needs to be 
substituted by non economic bonds broadly categorized by Weinstein as ‘social 
capital’ (shared norms or ideologies, friendship, family and ethnic ties). 
Disenfranchised youths, Weinstein argues, are likely to join richly-endowed violent 
movements while educated people, discounting the future to a lesser extent, may be 
recruited in ideologically strong organizations. Weinstein’s model has important  
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implications for the sustainability of violent groups over time. Monetary-based 
enlistment is assumed to entail weaker commitment than social capital-based 
militancy. As a consequence, rebellions built upon strong non-economic bonds are 
likely to last longer than purely predatory movements.  
 
Weinstein’s model has two major characteristics that we want to discuss. First, his 
binary typology of insurgent groups rests on a demand-driven approach of rebellion-
making, structurally determined by access to finance. Rebel leaders are left with two 
options, namely going for the ‘opportunistic’ or ‘activist’ type of violent labor force. 
Which choice will prevail is dictated in advance by economic constraints. Recruits 
subsequently self-select into the collective accordingly, without modifying the inner 
logic of the group. Does this sequential and binary rationale apply to Nigerian ethnic 
militias is our first interrogation. Second, when analyzing the dynamic of armed 
groups, Weinstein grants “initial conditions” a determining role, making further 
changes over time path-dependent. Is path dependency the correct way to envisage 
armed groups’ dynamic is our second question. Both questions are treated by looking 
at the Oodua People’s Congress, an ethnic militia active in Nigeria whose history has 
been carefully studied and of which 167 of its militants have been interviewed at 
length through structured questionnaires. Specifically, we address Weinstein’s two 
major statements by firstly looking at whether the profile and subjective motives for 
enlistment of rank and files of the militia are unambiguously and sufficiently 
homogenous to reflect one single, ex ante, economically determined recruitment 
strategy pertaining to Weinstein’s binary alternative; and by, secondly, evaluating the 




3. A NIGERIAN ETHNIC MILITIA: THE OODUA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 
 
(a) Violence in Nigerian Politics 
 
Nigeria’s tormented recent political history combines many of the stereotypes 
attached to conflict-prone countries. Oil represents an average of 70% of Nigeria’s 
past years’ federal revenues (Bach, 2004; Mustapha, 2002). Standards of living 
remain poor: around 70% of Nigerians live on less than one dollar a day and 44% of 
the young men aged between 20 and 24 are unemployed (National Population 
Commission, 2000). For decades now, Nigeria has been struggling with its ‘national 
question’, consisting of bringing together its extremely diverse ethnic and religious 
constituents. Three ‘majority’ groups account for 50% of the population: the Hausa-
Fulani (North), the Yoruba (Southwest) and the Igbo (East). ‘Minority’ groups are 
particularly present in the Middle Belt or in the coastal Niger Delta region. The 
population in the North is mainly Muslim while the South is mainly Christian. These 
ethno-religious divides coincide with strong economic and social imbalances. Military 
regimes have ruled the country most of the time since independence from Britain in 
1960. Democracy was introduced in 1999 but hasn’t erased elites’ corrupt behaviors 
inherited from three decades of dictatorial rule. Repressive governing methods and 
opaque management of the oil rent have prevented the development of harmonious 
political and redistributive institutions, despite Nigeria’s federal polity. Nigeria’s 
political instability in the past decades partly stems from its peculiar political 
economy. Oil revenues are accumulated at the federal level to be re-allocated to other 
tiers of the Federation in accordance with a complex and disputed formula. The 
outcome is that each tier of the Federation is bonded to the Centre via clientelistic  
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relations. States and Local Governments’ resources are almost exclusively derived 
from transfers from the ‘Federation Account’ (Ahmad & Singh, 2003). Regional and 
local representatives then tend to focus their political efforts exclusively on securing 
an access to the federal rent, disregarding the social and economic aspirations of their 
local constituencies. This ‘representation without taxation’ effect (Guyer, 1994) fuels 
the criminalization of politics. As shown by the elections in April 2007, electoral 
appointments are violently contested via sponsored armed groups used to help 
perpetuating local ‘godfathers’’ political rule. In this struggle, ethnic rhetoric is 
frequently resorted to as an instrument to mobilize the voters
3. Symptomatically, the 
three major ethnic groups in the country and many ‘minority groups’ are represented 
by one or more militias allegedly defending their ‘rights’. The Oodua People’s 
Congress (OPC) is one of the most prominent of these groups.   
 
(b) Are Nigerian ethnic militias rebel groups? 
 
Ethnic militias in the Nigerian context are particular insurgent groups. Most of them 
defend a “cause” aligned with ethnic interests; they have access to coercive means and 
are embroiled in numerous deadly face-offs with the police or other communities. 
These features explain why we chose Weinstein’s analysis of the ‘politics of insurgent 
violence’ as our principal theoretical inspiration. However, Nigerian ethnic militias 
are not rebellions in the sense of groups ultimately aiming to overthrow incumbents, 
opting for clandestineness and waging guerilla type of warfare. This is because, one 
may argue following Reno (Reno, 2002), local political and economic baronies 
                                                 
3 Detailed accounts on political elites’ activation of youths gangs and militias in the Niger Delta are 
provided by Human Rights Watch (2007) and Ukiwo (2007).  
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ultimately manage to engulf them in their patronage network and instrumentalise 
them. Their reformist social messages based on self-determination claims along ethnic 
lines as well as their massive grassroots support fail to induce radical political change 
as, most of the time, ruling elites manage to divert their agenda for their own electoral 
benefits. In Nigeria, OPC and the likes don’t reject the political game in the way early 
Latin American revolutionary guerillas negated party politics and privileged 
immediate military action (Arenas, 1972). Nigerian militias tend to become 
constitutive elements of an intrinsically violent electoral system resorting to fraud and 
physical intimidation of opponents and voters (Human Rights Watch, 2003a, Human 
Rights Watch, 2007). Revealingly, several of our OPC informants mentioned the 
actions they personally took, against payment, to coercively induce voters to opt for 
their local political patron during the 2003 general elections. It happens though that 
some groups escape the close monitoring by elites and conduct full-scale 
insurgencies: the multiple groups operating in the Niger Delta illustrate vividly this 
uncontrolled process, many of them having initially benefited from local high profile 
figures’ support during the 2003 elections before emancipating themselves from 
original clientelistic allegiances. Ethnic militias are then collective objects very 
idiosyncratic to Nigerian political economy, hybrid creatures made of culturally-based 
reformist insurgencies, armed wings of political parties, but also, as developed later, 
extra-legal governance agencies (Guichaoua, 2009). Still, they face the same kind of 
organizational puzzle that rebellions in the Weinstein’s sense generally face: raising 
funds, recruiting manpower, consolidating internal cohesion… to serve objectives 
mostly achieved by using coercive powers. But importantly, Reno’s hypothesis on the 
engulfment of ethnic militias in patronage politics equips us with a possible 
alternative to Weinstein’s path dependent model of organizational change. How  
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resilient is the armed movement to the external pressure of party politics then 
becomes the key factor behind its transformation. 
 
(c) OPC’s organizational dynamic 
 
Here we analyze OPC’s design, organizational structure and leadership in a dynamic 
perspective. We argue that OPC was founded on solid pre-existing social networks, 
with the explicit political goal of achieving self-determination for the Yoruba. 
However the concrete means to achieve this objective have been ambiguous as 
political activism was progressively superseded by money-making activities such as 
vigilantism and collusion with political parties. How this shift was accompanied by 
changes in recruits’ profiles is a crucial step towards our assessment of Weinstein’s 
perspective.  
 
The following empirical account is based on in-depth literature reviews, systematic 
analysis of Nigerian press clippings referring to the OPC and interviews with national 
and local leaders as well as members of the rank and file of the OPC between 2004 
and late 2006. Also, external observers of the OPC have been interviewed, including 
scholars in Ibadan and Lagos and civil society representatives concerned with security 
issues. 
 
The Oodua People’s Congress, named after Oduduwa, the mythological ancestor of 
the Yoruba, is one of the largest ethnic militias in contemporary Nigeria. It is very 
influential in the states demographically dominated by the Yoruba, i.e. Lagos, Edo, 
Ekiti, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Kwara and Kogi states. OPC’s objectives - duly  
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written in its constitution - have a classic nationalist flavor, glorifying the past and the 
necessity to preserve the Yoruba cultural and social legacy. Aims of the OPC go as 
follows: ‘to identify with our historical and cultural origin with a view to re-living the 
glory of our past for the purpose of posterity; to educate and mobilize the descendants 
of Oduduwa for the purpose of the above; to integrate the aspirations and values of all 
the descendants of Oduduwa into a collective platform of an Oodua entity; to monitor 
the various interests of descendants of Oduduwa […] and struggle for the protection 
of these interests; […] to further the progress of Oodua civilization by protection and 
promoting our value, mores and the inter-generational transmission of same’ (quoted 
in Human Rights Watch, 2003b: 4). A central political claim of the OPC is the 
organization of a ‘Sovereign National Conference’ in order to redraw radically the 
rules of the Federation towards greater autonomy for the regions.  
 
The OPC claims the support of several millions members spread worldwide
4. Whether 
these members are card-carrying members regularly attending meetings or mere 
sympathizers occasionally contributing to the activities of the group is difficult to 
verify, as is the proportion of "esos" (the best trained "soldiers") among the militants. 
OPC’s geographical coverage is wide and includes both rural and urban settings of the 
claimed ‘Yorubaland’. Its hierarchical structure is composed of four levels. National 
headquarters are based in Lagos where the two factional leaders, Frederick Fasehun 
and Gani Adams, reside. The organization has delegates at the state and local 
                                                 
4 In 2003, OPC’s main faction claims to have enlisted 4.8 millions members, a probably exaggerated 
figure. We propose the following tentative calculation to estimate the number of supporters in the sole 
Oyo State where most of our research was carried out: the alleged number of OPC’s smallest local 
units (the ‘zone’) in Oyo State is 500. If we consider 30 as the average number of affiliates per zone, 
then Oyo State OPC’s manpower amounts to 15 000 individuals.  
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government levels. Each local government is divided into zones led by a ‘zonal 
coordinator’. The number of zones per local government depends on the number of 
grassroots affiliates. New zones are created as outgrowths of existing zones of a 
sufficient size (i.e. over 50 militants). Zones are OPC’s most important decision-
making level. Zonal coordinators have important, if not total, liberty to decide what 
action is to be carried out. Money is also raised at the zonal level, through fixed 
contributions by militants or payments of fees by the population for safeguarding 
areas or providing other services such as adjudication of conflicts (e.g. between 
landlords and tenants). Zonal representatives have regular encounters with local 
government and state-level coordinators to whom fees collected at the grassroots level 
are partially remitted. State representatives meet the national coordinator in Lagos 
every week. 
 
The OPC was created under very specific circumstances characterized by frustrated 
promises of democratic transition and fierce repression of political opposition, under 
the highly corrupt and repressive military rule of General Sani Abacha. Its founder 
Frederick Fasehun, a prosperous highly-educated medical doctor, was known to be a 
union and human rights activist before becoming an ethnic leader. To him, embracing 
the ethnic cause was the unavoidable consequence of the course of political events 
(Fasehun, 2002). It stemmed from his utter personal conviction that the ruling 
Northern elite would never hand over power to civilians after it annulled the ‘June, 
12’ elections in 1993 supposedly putting an end to the military era. Moshood Abiola, 
a rich Yoruba businessman, was denied electoral victory by the regime, thus creating 
a profound trauma among Nigerians and, particularly the Yoruba. In the aftermath of 
the annulment, an Interim National Government was installed by General Ibrahim  
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Babangida. It was soon overthrown by another General, Sani Abacha, who imposed a 
fierce dictatorship, accompanied by numerous political assassinations and massive 
diversion of public funds. This political development pushed many human rights 
activists and democrats into clandestine activities. Among the democrats were many 
Yorubas from the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Abacha’s major 
political target. Fasehun was one of NADECO’s main figures. The OPC was created 
in August 1994 as a reaction to government’s brutality. It was godfathered by 
prominent Yoruba political and cultural figures and helped logistically by existing 
civil society structures like road workers’ unions and traditional secret societies called 
Oro ((Nolte, 2004)). Oro societies used to be ‘male-only civic associations’ closely 
linked to Yorubaland’s major nationalist party in the 1950s and 1960s, the Action 
Group, founded by Obafemi Awolowo, the charismatic Premier of the Western region 
prior to independence. Oro societies were also in charge of crime fighting activities. 
Crucially, OPC’s was not an entire novelty in Yoruba social landscape. Its success 
wouldn’t have been possible without the activation of already existing social networks 
and structures, deeply rooted in the society. Right at its start, OPC enjoyed a 
significant social capital endowment that helped channeling the first waves of recruits, 
making the movement resemble Weinstein’s “activist” type of armed group. 
 
A large bulk of our informants considers that the year 1999 was a turning point in the 
movement’s history, a view confirmed by Akinyele (Akinyele, 2001) and 
international NGO Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). A shift in 
OPC’s strategy toward violence seemingly occurred. It coincided with the end of the 
military regime and the appointment of a Yoruba President, Olusegun Obasanjo 
which automatically weakened the legitimacy of OPC’s core argument of Yoruba  
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marginalization in the Federation. Secondly, an alleged upsurge of criminal violence - 
or, more probably, a growing perception of such a phenomenon - progressively 
transformed the OPC into a vigilante movement. Finally, OPC’s trajectory was greatly 
affected by the rise of a young and charismatic challenger to Fasehun: Gani Adams. In 
the beginning of 1999, for reasons still hotly debated, the OPC broke up into two 
factions, respectively led by Fasehun and Adams. Adams became the radical flag 
bearer of a generation which had been denied the chance to pursue education, a role 
that Fasehun’s educated profile prevented him from holding (Maier, 2002). Crucially, 
while Fasehun seemingly considered that OPC inflammable youths ‘able to flex their 
muscles’ should remain under the control of educated leaders (Fasehun, 2005), 
Adams’ perspective on what a good OPC militant is approaches the disenfranchised 
youth type (Guichaoua, 2009).  
 
Although Adams’ OPC theoretically shares the same political goals as Fasehun’s 
(Adams, 2003),  under his rule, OPC’s ethnic rhetoric explicitly appeals to 
disenfranchised youths, notably through the crafting of a sanctimonious narrative of 
Adams’ personal biography: from his apprenticeship as a modest carpenter to the top 
of OPC (Adebanwi, 2005). The organization was strategically redirected towards a 
less politicized clientele, a shift that seems to have been enacted in recruitment 
policies. Violent clashes involving the OPC also fuelled that trend. During the first 
years of Obasanjo’s regime, the OPC was implicated in multiple gruesome clashes 
against other ethnic groups, the police or alleged criminal gangs (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003b; Okechukwu, 2000; Akinyele, 2001). One of our informants insisted 
that these various confrontations, said to have claimed hundreds of lives, forced the 




At the same time, vigilantism progressively became one of OPC’s main sources of 
finance. Criminality is perceived as a major concern in Nigeria, particularly in urban 
settings
5. The questionable efficiency of the police in fighting crime, their pervasive 
corruption and heavy-handed and arbitrary behavior (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005; 
Albert, Awe, Hérault, & Omitoogun, 1995) have pushed communities to organize 
their security themselves, a trend exemplified by the burgeoning of “gated 
communities” in all major Nigerian cities (Fabiyi, 2004).  
 
OPC’s equipment comprises standard cheap weapons such as locally produced, 
smuggled or stolen firearms. But, more importantly, being rooted in Yoruba ancestral 
tradition, OPC members are widely acknowledged to master magical techniques of 
defense, attack or divination - warranted by oath-taking ceremonies of new recruits -, 
a characteristic which grants them a substantial comparative advantage in security and 
crime fighting activities. Additionally, OPC’s services are more affordable than those 
of formal private security outfits. OPC militants have thus been appointed by zonal 
coordinators to perform security activities at fixed rates (Akinyele, 2007).  
 
Although OPC militants’ interactions with their civilian neighbors generally happen 
through voluntary commercial transactions, instances of business protection rackets 
are suspected, in particular where the movement monopolizes security provision to 
entire market places. Importantly, beside the vigilantism and crime-fighting 
                                                 
5 A recent victimisation survey reports strong feelings of physical insecurity among the Lagosians. 
Almost half of the interviewees spread all over Lagos say they resort to formal or informal vigilantism 
to protect their neighbourhood (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005).  
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businesses, OPC also performs as a civil dispute mediator. It arbitrates 
landlord/tenants issues (Okechukwu, 2000) or acts as a debt collector. Today’s 
organization’s activities mostly pertain to the multifaceted realm of extra-legal 
governance which encompasses a wide array of duties expectedly undertaken by the 
state (Dixit, 2003). It thus constitutes an ambiguous political and social actor, at the 
same time deeply rooted in Yoruba ‘civil society’ and political networks and inclined 
to perform a variety of money-making activities.  
 
To situate the OPC in Weinstein’s typology proves uneasy because the movement’s 
original combat for self-determination has apparently been blurred by the 
diversification of its social and political role. Today, activism and opportunistic 
motives, as the history of the organization suggests, coexist within the same 
movement and, one may even argue, seem to be self-reinforcing. However, a more 
careful sequencing of OPC’s trajectory over time suggests that these two features 
have had different temporal momentums, an hypothesis we explore later. We will now 
verify whether this internal ambiguity is mirrored by grassroots militants’ subjective 
motives and profiles. 
 
4. MILITIA GRASSROOTS MILITANTS’ PROFILES AND SUBJECTIVE 




The empirical evidence that sustains this section’s findings is based on the analysis of 
a survey conducted among 167 OPC active rank and files in Lagos and Ibadan, the  
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two largest cities of the ‘Yorubaland’. Due to absence of access to full updated 
registers of members or OPC local sub-units, the selection of respondents was not 
random. Hence, our sample is not statistically representative. It relied on several 
personal entry points in the OPC developed in the course of research. These entry 
points were disconnected from each other, thus minimizing the risk of bias in the 
types of respondents encountered. We managed to obtain the clearance to carry out 
individual interviews in nine zones (eight in Ibadan, one in Lagos), supervised by 
zonal coordinators who were also interviewed at length. These nine zones represent a 
tiny fraction of the number of zones in each city which amount to several dozens. 
Accessing zones claiming Fasehun’s patronage proved impossible. This mainly 
reflects the shrinkage of Fasehun’s hold on the rank and file level since Adams’s rise 
in the organization
6. The followers of an OPC splinter group, the Federation of 
Yoruba Culture and Consciousness (FYCC) were also interviewed. They represent 
two of the nine zones surveyed.  
 
Although the choice of zones covered by the survey was not random, the number of 
respondents in each zone was exhaustive, with all the militants attached to one zone 
interviewed. However, since interviews were conducted at the weekly meeting of the 
group, those who repeatedly missed the gathering are absent from our sample. 
Presence at meeting is a zonal coordinator’s major concern. Absentees are fined by 
the zonal coordinator
7. One might therefore expect that the bias stemming from only 
interviewing those who attend meeting is marginal. Furthermore, by including 
                                                 
6 However, as a founding father of OPC Fasehun remains a respected OPC figure. 
7 Each meeting actually starts by reminding past absentees to pay their dues, which generally triggers 
vivid negotiations.  
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everyone, our strategy minimized the risk of only selecting ‘gatekeepers’ of the group, 
used to communicate with outsiders.  
 
The originality of the survey lies largely in the fact that interviewees are current active 
members of a violent group. Most existing surveys are based on interviews with ex-
combatants. By definition, surveys focusing on ex-combatants don’t sample those 
who died in combat. We don’t face this kind of bias. But conversely, as violence is of 
a mild degree in the setting we observed – which was the condition sine qua non of 
feasibility of the survey – we have no certainty that the selected respondents would 
participate in high intensity violence such as, say, large-scale massacres. A greater 
intensity of violence might deter some of the militia members from continuing 
militancy and provoke the enlistment of other types of individuals, less risk adverse. 
As a result, one should bear in mind that this section is more about who joins than 
who actually fights.  
 
The questionnaire was structured to record respondents’ socio-economic profiles, life 
histories, the process through which they were recruited, their motives, and their 
duties and gains derived from militia membership. Interviews were carried out by 
experienced Yoruba speaking research assistants, in conditions ensuring the highest 
confidentiality feasible. In this research, attention was solely paid to OPC members. 
No control group was included so that profiles of militants cannot be compared with 
similar non-militants. This may constitute a major limitation of our work, would our 
research question have primarily revolved around participation in armed struggle (in 
the direction followed, for example, by Humphreys and Weinstein (Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2008)). This is not our main goal here as our primary focus is on  
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Weinstein‘s hypothesis on internal consistency between organizational and micro-
level characteristics of armed groups. A look at the inner functioning of the movement 
may suffice to address this issue. However, when possible, we try to contrast our 
findings with existing statistical evidence for the comparable population in the region, 
as a way to contextualize our empirical findings.  
 
(b) Ordinary people? OPC militants’ activities and sociological characteristics 
 
Following the above statements on the organizational evolution of OPC under Adams’ 
impetus, one would expect the movement to be more attractive to the ‘opportunistic’ 
type of recruits, namely disenfranchised youths willing to make quick material profits. 
Is this assumption empirically valid?  
 
The breakdown of activities undertaken by our respondents on behalf of OPC shows 
that security provision and cultural gatherings are OPC militants’ two main 
occupations (see table 1). Political matters, despite being discussed at length with 
other militants, don’t spark off regular concrete actions. Furthermore, the average 
time devoted by militants to the group remains low: seven hours per week. Militancy 
in the OPC doesn’t entail total devotion to the cause, nor does it encompass all aspects 




Table 1. Activities of OPC militants 
 
Average number of hours devoted to the 
militia per week 
7 
     
Type of training received (percentage of 
yes) 
  
   use of traditional means of protection  96 
   unarmed combat  90 
   armed combat  78 
     
Activities (percentage of yes)    
   participation  in  cultural  meetings 
(festivals) 
92 
   political discussions  83 
   spiritual activities  74 
   political demonstrations  32 
   crime-fighting operations  88 
   security   82 
   actions against other groups  60 
 
 
The OPC members surveyed are 31 years old on average. They are overwhelmingly 
male (90%) but our qualitative evidence suggest that women are also welcome to 
fulfill specific duties: they are granted a specific role in the internal division of labor: 
they are prohibited from performing night operations like vigilantism but serve as 
privileged informants in the struggle against crime. (Nolte, 2008) also notes that they 
support and motivate combatants during fights and make sure no one behaves 
cowardly by ridiculing those not showing enough courage in action.  
 
Eight interviewees out of ten are Muslims. This figure is surprisingly high as the 
Southwest of Nigeria is said to be predominantly Christian. It might be related to 
Yoruba Muslims’ greater tolerance towards magical practices rigidly rejected by 
Christians. Incidentally, it shows that their anti-North discourse doesn’t follow  
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confessional lines since the majority of Northerners share the same religion (although 
they belong to different brotherhoods).  
 
Levels of education, occupations (table 2) and social connectedness (table 3) are the 
most telling indicators in assessing the disenfranchised youth hypothesis. Results are 
unequivocal: OPC members’ average educational achievement is close to that 
measured among the general South-western Yoruba male population surveyed in 
(National Population Commission, 2004). In addition, almost none of them are 
jobless. They earn on average US$ 27 a week, far above the absolute poverty line. 
However, if not extremely deprived economically, OPC rank and file militants face 
the typical economic vulnerability inherent to informal sector activities where more 




Table 2. Indicators of human capital and economic integration of OPC militants (in 
brackets: results of the Demographic and Health Survey for the year 2003 among 
Yoruba males above 18 and leaving in the southwest region) 
 
Level of education (%)    
no school  2 (6) 
some primary  10 (4) 
primary completed  25 (20)
some secondary  26 (30)
secondary completed  28 (23)
above secondary  8 (17) 
Other 1  (0) 
     
Occupation (per cent)    
Jobless 1 
Student 9 
unpaid employee  3 
unprotected paid employee  10 
self employed – trader  61 
self employed – artisan  14 
civil servant  1 
Other 1 
     
Average weekly income (naira)  3470 
 
 
In terms of social integration, OPC members do not look like faithless and lawless 
individuals. A vast majority of them is married, has children and lives in rented 
houses
8. Militants don’t hide their affiliation to OPC: it is public knowledge in the 
neighborhood they live in for almost 70% of the respondents. 
 
                                                 
8 One could contest this statement by suggesting that members may currently run parallel unobservable 
illegal activities or that they may have carried out criminal activities in the past. For obvious reason, 
this possibility is hardly verifiable through structured interviews. In some specific instances, though - 
and particularly in Lagos -, it seems clear that some of the interviewees do have a criminal record or 
belong to the ‘loose molecule’ type. One of the women interviewed is almost certainly a sex worker 
while another male interviewee has admitted having been imprisoned several times. However, this 
perfect ‘thug-profile’ doesn’t at all represent the majority of the people interviewed.  
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Table 3. Indicators of social integration of militants (%) 
 
Proportion of married members  64
Proportion of members with children  69
Proportion of members renting their own housing unit  64
Do people in your neighborhood know you're a militia member (per cent of yes)  68
 
 
Both in economic and social terms, OPC members are not of the “disenfranchised 
youth” type. They have rather ordinary people’s observable profiles. Their 
opportunity cost of joining is far from nil – even if it is lessened by the fact that being 
a militia member is not a full-time activity. As a result, the militia rank and files we 
have interviewed shouldn’t be theoretically particularly motivated to join on purely 
economic incentives. The reasons they give for doing so and the processes through 
which they have been recruited are reported below.  
 
(c) Subjective motives of ethnic militancy: the desire for protection 
 
Table 4 synthesizes the answers provided on motives and recruitment channels. 
Immediate material benefits are not primary motives for enlistment which confirms 
the above finding on socio-economic profiles of militants. On the contrary, perceived 
indirect benefits such as protection and social status promotion constitute major 




Table 4. Enlistment motives and recruitment processes 
 
When joining the militia, did you expect that your new situation could… (%)    
facilitate your access to cash  11
increase your chances to get a new/better job  17
facilitate your contacts with opp. sex  22
improve the way you are considered in the neighborhood  45
grant you new powers to defend yourself and your relatives  90
expand your political awareness  31
     
Did a particular event decide you to join? (%)    
a personal event  19
a political event  15
     
Difference between the militia and other political or cultural organizations (%)    
well-organized  19
neat behavior  65
political project  29
better for business  4 
more protective  41
     
Channels of recruitment (%)    
friends, neighbors  60
patronage 22
spontaneous application  18
 
 
Immediate economic reasons (access to cash, better job) are expressed in less than one 
case out of five. Indeed, when we explored this issue further with respondents, most 
of them told us that being a militant is actually costly: in addition to fees paid weekly 
when attending meetings, the regular purchase of charms necessary to carry out 
activities with the group entails substantial expenses. The most often quoted reason to 
join refers to the desire for protection. Charms obtained through OPC membership are 
reputed to favor economic prosperity, good health, social success and, above all, 
protection against enemies (notably the police). In short, what seems to fuel 
enlistment is a feeling of vulnerability. This is confirmed by individual reports, 
mentioning, for example, the ‘fear of unknown future’ as an impetus behind 
affiliation. The anxiety motivating the enlistment is also present in the respondents’  
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justifications for choosing OPC rather than any other group: a large majority of them 
acclaim OPC’s ‘neat behavior’, i.e. the fact that, unlike political parties or local self-
help groups, the organization ‘doesn’t cheat’ its members. OPC is viewed as a group 
that cares for its needy followers. It is expected to have a direct and immediate 
positive impact on its members’ well-being. Among the many positive characteristics 
of OPC quoted by respondents are: ‘solidarity
9’, ‘oneness’, ‘togetherness’ etc. All 
these expressions refer to protection and sense of belonging and, to some extent, 
spiritual elevation. Importantly, whether through increased personal prestige or 
enlargement of bonding social connections, OPC is also perceived as a facilitator of 
status promotion by many: almost 45% of the respondents expect that joining OPC 
will improve the personal respect they enjoy in their neighborhood. Sex is also said to 
be made easier by membership by a non-negligible proportion of respondents (22%).  
 
Crucially, these views seem to be influenced and encouraged by militants’ entourage 
which often facilitates the enlistment. Less than one out of five respondents 
spontaneously applied to OPC. Others were recommended by friends and patrons who 
were generally already members. “Social capital”, as Weinstein would put it, is 
blatantly at play here. But one should note that recruitment through friends and 
recruitment through patrons may have different consequences for the type of 
socialization the group produces locally: solidarity among equals differs from 
paternalistic distribution through patronage. In the zone surveyed in Lagos, most of 
the militants were recruited by the coordinator among his immediate social network. 
This was a way for the coordinator to distribute personal favors and hence reinforce 
                                                 
9 ‘Solidarity for ever’ is the group motto, chanted repetitively during meetings.  
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his local patronage. Recruiting OPC members appears to be a highly “social capital 
intensive” activity. 
 
Purely ideological motives for enlistment are less salient than motives of security, 
solidarity or insurance mediated by a strong sense of social belonging. As shown in 
table 4, only 31% of the respondents thought that becoming an OPC member could 
expand their political awareness. Stressing the salience of non ideology-related 
motives doesn’t necessarily cast doubt on respondents’ sincerity towards the OPC’s 
political ‘cause’. All respondents have assimilated the Yoruba nationalist rhetoric of 
their leaders. When prompted to tell the interviewer what OPC is, they, without 
hesitation, almost systematically put forward its collective objective consisting in 
‘promoting and protecting Yoruba interests in Nigeria’. However as shown by the 
statistical hierarchy of the answers provided in table 5, ideological adherence to the 
organization doesn’t constitute an obstacle to the presence of other, much more 
diverse, considerations when joining. It might simply constitute a fundamental object 
of consensus among the militants, beyond which many other characteristics make the 
membership of the organization desirable. 
 
(d) Actual gains: protected economic exchanges, assistance and subjective well-
being 
 
Does OPC match the expectations of its militants? A look at the immediate actual 
gains obtained through militia membership (table 5) confirms the above results. It 
shows that protection and assistance are effectively provided by the OPC. This 
protection is symbolic or spiritual (charms, also called jujus) and material. Cash is  
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offered to militants in case of injury, illness or other unfortunate personal event. 
Strikingly, OPC supersedes family as a source of assistance: the group can be said to 
form a space of socialization which reliably provides help. In addition, a great 
majority of the militia rank and file benefit from the more regular, although indirect, 
solidarity permitted by continuous business relations. The OPC is therefore not only 
an informal insurance mechanism protecting against idiosyncratic risks, it also forms 
a restricted sphere of continuous economic exchanges, for the exclusive benefit of its 
members. Obviously, one cannot rule out the possibility that this informal solidarity 
network tying up OPC militants predated any membership since, as already observed, 
recruitment is frequently channeled through existing social bonds. The least we can 
say, however, is that OPC membership represents an opportunity to strengthen and, 
probably enhance (e.g. through vigilantism) the benefits of this ‘moral economy’
10. 
As shown in the table, these solidarity ties do not necessarily result in a tangible 
improvement of respondent’s economic situation but in a dramatic improvement of 
their feelings of protection and psychological comfort. ‘Peace of mind’, ‘rest of 
mind’, ‘confidence’ are very often quoted as major changes induced by membership.  
 
                                                 
10 An individual case we observed perfectly illustrates this point: a state representative we regularly 
interacted with was running a private security outfit. Although he swore his militancy and his business 




Table 5. Material and non-material rewards of militia membership 
 
Immediate rewards before or after operations (%)    
Cash 6 
Food 5 
non medical drugs / jujus  76 
     
First source of assistance in case of problems (%)    
Nobody 3 
spouse / partner  10 
Parents 23 
brothers / sisters  4 
other relatives  2 
local militia leaders  8 
other militia members  31 
non-militia friends  11 
     
Militia as part of the first 4 sources of assistance (%)  63 
     
Does the militia help in case of… (percentage of yes)    
injury in operation  98 
Illness 99 
other urgent need  99 
     
Proportion of members having business contacts with other 
members  63 
     
What has the movement brought to your life (open-ended 
question, %)    
psychological comfort / behavioral improvement  41 
no more problem  10 
Protection 40 
better economic situation  16 
nothing yet  7 
 
 
The OPC shares many features with the sectarian groups and club goods providers at 
once described by Iannaccone and Berman (Iannaccone, 1994; Iannaccone & Berman, 
2006): entry requires sacrifices (in our case: oath taking, devotion of time, display of 
courage, purchase of jujus etc.) which helps to screen applicants and reinforces the 
credibility of their commitment toward the group. Such groups, Iannaccone and 
Berman continue, are likely to emerge in contexts where the provision of social  
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services by the government is low, which is blatantly the case in Nigeria. The OPC 
acts as a club-goods provider in a socio-economic environment largely abandoned by 
the state. This feature hardly fits with the binary perspective proposed by Weinstein, 
as it encompasses simultaneously psychological and emotional investment as well as a 
complex web of economic transactions. This is the present situation of OPC, though. 
Yet, in line with Weinstein’s hypothesis on consistency between organizational and 
micro-level characteristics of armed groups and following our earlier questioning on a 
possible structural change of the organization happening around the year 1999, we 
want to check whether heterogeneity of profiles or motives prevails among militants. 
 
(e) Heterogeneity among militants? 
 
We hypothesize that the coexistence of various kinds of motives to join might reflect 
some degree of heterogeneity of preferences within our sample, possibly 
encompassing Weinstein’s binary alternative. Since we observed an organizational 
shift from the original determined activism in reaction to government’s brutality 
towards lucrative extra-legal governance activities, we could expect the group to be 
composed of a mixture of ‘old days’ politicized activists and recent short-termist 
opportunists - all these notions being obviously relative. A way to verify this 
hypothesis is to split the sample into two subgroups, respectively composed of early 
joiners and late joiners. Using the year 1999 as a reference point to differentiate 
between the two subgroups makes sense: the inception of the Fourth Republic 
constitutes a major turning point in Nigerian political history, likely to have deeply 
affected social attitudes toward militancy and popular claims, particularly among the 
Yoruba who, after the elections, had a kinsman, Olusegun Obasanjo, in charge of the  
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country’s destiny. Of course our comparison rests on the - pretty strong - assumption 
that early joiners haven’t all defected and/or haven’t entirely abandoned their initial 
ideals. Yet, the mere fact that they remain in OPC signals some minimal degree of 
acceptance of the organization’s suspected strategic evolution. Any remaining trace of 
heterogeneity would thus be, we argue, a telling indicator of time-changing attributes 
of OPC militancy.  
 
We use standard mean comparison tests to see whether pre-democracy joiners differ 
systematically from post-democracy joiners in various respects. We choose to 
compare individual characteristics that, as far as possible, don’t change over time, in 
order to make sure that observed differences do not only reflect the ‘normal’ course of 
time: pre-democracy joiners earn more money than post-democracy joiners but this 
might only reflect age differences and standard trajectories of earning patterns and 
accumulation of human capital. Despite these caveats, clear differences are still 
observable between the two subgroups that tend to strengthen the hypothesis of a shift 
of recruits’ profiles, from ‘ideologues’ toward more self-interested and less politicized 




















0.64 (0.04)  0.00 










0.15 (0.03)  0.09 
Expectations when joining       
   Cash 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.14 (0.03)  -0.09** 






   Sex 
0.19 
(0.06) 
0.23 (0.04)  -0.04 
   Respect 
0.45 
(0.08) 
0.46 (0.04)  -0.01 
   Powers 
0.83 
(0.06) 
0.92 (0.02)  -0.09 
   Political awareness 
0.33 
(0.07) 
0.30 (0.04)  0.03 
Promises made when 
joining 
    
   Political promises 
0.21 
(0.06) 
0.20 (0.04)  0.01 






   Material promises 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.06 (0.02)  -0.04  
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Activities within OPC       
   Cultural 
0.90 
(0.05) 
0.87 (0.03)  0.03 
   Political discussions 
0.76 
(0.07) 
0.74 (0.04)  0.02 
   Spiritual 
0.62 
(0.08) 
0.58 (0.04)  0.04 
   Political demonstrations 
0.29 
(0.07) 
0.17 (0.03)  0.08 
   Crime-fighting 
0.90 
(0.05) 
0.77 (0.04)  0.13** 
   Security 
0.71 
(0.07) 
0.69 (0.04)  0.02 




0.46 (0.04)  0.13 
What has OPC brought to 
your life? 
    
   Psychological benefits 
0.43 
(0.08) 
0.41 (0.04)  0.02 
   No more problem 
0.10 
(0.05) 
0.10 (0.03)  0.00 
   Greater protection 
0.52 
(0.08) 
0.36 (0.04)  0.16* 






Standard errors in brackets 
***: significant at 99% of confidence 
**: significant at 95% of confidence 
*: significant at 90% of confidence 
 
Here, differences are of greater importance than absolute figures. Answers between 
the two sub-groups significantly differ in many important respects. First of all, 
political events have more often constituted an impetus for enlistment for pre- 
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democracy joiners than for post-democracy joiners. ‘June 12’ annulment of Abiola’s 
election was frequently mentioned by pre-democracy joiners, mirroring the often 
quoted ‘trauma’ that this annulment provoked. Enlistment in the post-democracy era 
appears to be motivated by more self-interested considerations: post-democracy 
members mention their hopes, when entering the movement, to reap material benefits 
(access to cash or jobs) from their militancy in significantly higher proportions than 
their pre-democracy counterparts. This could reflect the evolution of OPC over time: 
after 1999, OPC was firmly installed as an extra-legal governance social institution 
opening up economic opportunities that could be easily foreseen by potential recruits. 
The immediate post-1999 years are also those during which OPC was involved in 
some gruesome clashes. According to many of our informants, this coincided with the 
recruitment of ‘all sorts of thugs’ or ‘bad eggs’, largely as a consequence of 
indiscriminate police repression. Interestingly in this respect, the late joiners were 
more often explicitly promised some protection when joining. This maybe signals 
OPC’s deliberate decision to use its alleged expertise in magic practices to attract new 
applicants. Finally post-democracy joiners also admit relatively more often that their 
membership had a positive impact on their economic situation - a dimension of 
membership which is almost absent from the reports of pre-democracy joiners. The 
latter stress their greater feeling of protection since enlistment. A last significant 
difference between the two strata of the OPC members of our sample is less 
straightforwardly interpretable: the participation in crime-fighting operations is more 
frequent among the early joiners. This might be explained by the hierarchical division 
of labor prevailing within the movement. The most senior members might be more 
skilled (physically and spiritually) to engage in this kind of activity which certainly 
also attracts local prestige. Whether these activities are more rewarding in monetary  
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terms compared to regular security provision such as vigilantism is a question that 
requires further investigation. What the above evidence still shows is that profiles of 
militants changed over time. Recruitment of militants seems to have been layered: 
early joiners share more of the characteristics of Weinstein’s ‘activists’ than late 
joiners who admit relatively more often opportunistic intentions behind their 
enlistment. Yet, we insist that this statement doesn’t reflect profound disagreement 
between the two sub-groups - notably on the undertaking of vigilantism or crime-
fighting operations by the movement - as shown by their ongoing presence in the 
movement. Note that attempts have been made to check intra-sample heterogeneity in 
other dimensions (location, age, factional affiliation) without producing significant 
results. 
 
Our results seemingly give credence to Weinstein’s view that a rise in the 
moneymaking opportunities attached with militancy favors the recruitment of 
opportunistic followers. However, there might be some confusing factor here as the 
rise of economic opportunities coincides with a change of leadership from which new 
patterns of recruitment may also derive: unlike his predecessor Fasehun, Gani Adams 
explicitly appealed to the marginalized youths. The change of militants’ profiles 
hence may reveal as much a shift of personal power balance within the organization 
as a strategic decision to develop lucrative activities. Both possibilities, one should 
add, are related to changes of the environment, specifically the violent clashes with 
the police that took place during the democratic transition which urged OPC leaders 
for rapid reactions and contributed to sideline those advocating less confrontational 
attitudes towards security forces. Despite uncertainty about dominant causal 
mechanisms at play, what the above shows is that the trajectory of OPC was shaped  
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by complex interdependent external and internal influences hardly attributable to the 
“initial conditions” in which the movement was created. The remaining overwhelming 
facts that recruitment follows preexisting social connections and that self-insurance 
concerns are pervasive among grassroots militants whose coercive powers are also 
used in party politics sustain Reno’s view on organizational change of Nigerian ethnic 
militias: they fail to radicalize and end up being caught in the mundane social webs of 
a moral economy dominated by patrons. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The present paper has discussed whether the particular form of organized insurgent 
violence that the OPC represents in Nigeria enters the binary typology proposed by 
Weinstein’s seminal work on rebellions. To Weinstein, economic constraints faced by 
rebel leaders are the major determinants of their recruitment strategies. Abundance of 
funds results in the recruitment of self-interested quasi-mercenaries while lack of 
resources necessitates alternative recruitment processes based on social or ideological 
ties. Weinstein’s approach’s extreme appeal resides in its parsimonious and 
simultaneous explanation of characteristics of armed groups and individual 
participants in organized insurgent violence. It appears though that the success of the 
OPC over time was jointly sustained by important preexisting social connections and 
numerous opportunities for economic gains. OPC, we argue, functions as a club goods 
provider or a restricted ‘moral economy’ whose members, tied to each other by a 
dense web of mundane transactions, enjoy self-insurance in an environment perceived 
as unsafe. Social capital and regular business contacts intimately mingle to ensure the 
continuation of the militia. The main bulk of OPC’s followers don’t display socio- 
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demographic characteristics making them resemble short-termist quasi-mercenaries. 
They are relatively not economically deprived. One should add that this statement 
reflects the movement’s present situation: early joiners seem more politicized than 
late comers, which resonates with Weinstein’s structural perspective. However one is 
unable to attribute this change to the organization’s opening up to lucrative activities 
or to a change in its leadership. At a more general level, why OPC doesn’t perfectly 
fit Weinstein’s perspective on rebellions may be ultimately explained by the Nigerian 
idiosyncratic context which prevents ethnic militias from drastically radicalising, 
despite their high propensity to resort to violence. As convincingly put by Reno 
(Reno, 2002), they end up being engulfed by patronage networks serving high-profile 
politicians. Notable exceptions to this phenomenon are the many insurgent groups of 
the Niger Delta determined to systematically confront the security forces. 
 
From a policy perspective, our findings highlight how the absence of provision of 
basic services by the state fuels the enlistment in ethnic militias. Self-insurance 
mechanisms proposed by the OPC have been showed to be the main drivers of 
engagement of grassroots militants, even superseding the hopes of immediate material 
rewards. The majority of joiners has families, runs licit - although informal - 
businesses and aspires to “neatness” and “oneness”, all characteristics that many 
ordinary Nigerians share. These are not fundamentally anti-social attitudes or 
worldviews to which force should be opposed. Quite oppositely, provision of both 
economic and physical security to populations might be the best way to prevent the 
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